Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1982

Diane Walch Reick v. Donald Thomas Reick : Brief
of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Robert M. Taylor; Brad L. Swaner; Attorneys for Appellant;
Pete N. Vlanos; Attorney for Respondent;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Reick v. Reick, No. 18229 (Utah Supreme Court, 1982).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2908

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF urAH

DIANE WALCH REICK,
Plaintiff and Resp:mdent,

vs.

No. 18229

OONALD THOMAS REICK,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Appeal :Eran the order of the Second Judicial District Court
for Weber County: The Honorable John F. Wahlquist, Judge

Robert M. Taylor

Brad L. swaner
SWANER AND TAYI.DR

Suite 722, Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
Pete N. Vlahos

2447 Kiesel Avenue
Ogden, Utah 84401
Attorne:z' for Respondent

FILED
APR 2 61982
. . . . . . . . -............... _ .... _________________...liif

CJor~ Su;irom1> Court, Ub~
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Statement of the case

Page
1

Disposition in Lower Court

1

Assignnent of Error

1

Relief Sought on Appeal

1

Staterrent of Facts

1

History of the Case

1

Canmencernent

2

Discovery

2

Evidentiary Hearing

3

Arguments Presented by the Parties

4

Holding of Court BelON

5

Appeal

5

"Unifonn Child Support Schedule,
Secom Judicial District"

6A

Explanation of Table

6B

Policy Statement

6C

Rule

6D

Argurrent

Point 1. Resi:ondent, having engaged in fraud
and deceit am thereby having failed to do
equity, was not entitled to a reward of
equitable relief.

7

Point 2o Under the facts presented, the
court belo.v substantially erred arrl abused
its discretion in finding a change in
circumstance sufficient to increase child
support and, further, in utilizing a predetenninErl schedule arrl consequently ordering
an increase in child support to $225.00 per
rronth.

9

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Point 3. Appellant was denied his constitutional right to due process of law by the
trial court's use of a predetennined schedule,
instead of the evidence adduced before it, to
establish child support.
Conclusion

15
18

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASE

case Name

Page Referred to
In Brief

Allen vs. Allen, 109 u. 99,
165 P.2d 872 (1946)

10

Barlow vs. Barlow, 282
S.W. 2d 429 (Texas 1955)

14

Bullen vs. Bullen, 71 U.63, 262
P.292 (Utah 1927)

10

Christiansen vs. Harris, 109 U 1,
163 P.2d 314, 317 (Utah 1945)

16

Qolerran Cgnpany, Inc. vs. Southwest Field Irrigation
Cc::mpany, 584 P.2d 883 (Utah 1978)

7

Dahlberg vs. Dahlberg, 77 u.. 157,
292 P. 214 (Utah 1930)

9

Ivins vs. Hardy, 333 P.2d 471,
Petition for Rehearing 334 P.2d 721,

(Montana 1959)

16

Jacobson vs. Jacobson, 557
P.2d 156 (Utah 1976)

7

McBroan vs. McBroan, 14 Utah 2d 393, 384
P. 2d 961 (1963)

9

O#ens vs. ONens, 579 P.2d 911
(Utah 1978)

10

Peery vs. Peery, 191 Neb. 782,
217 N.W.2d 837,
(Nebraska 1974)

15

Picker vs. Vollenhover, 290 P.2d
789,
(Oregon 1955)

15

Pinion vs. Pinion, 92 Utah 255
67 P.2d 265 (1937)

10

State of Washington ex rel. Oregon Railroad & Navigation
Cgnpany vs. Fairchild, 224 U.S. 510, 524-25, 56 L.Ed.
863, 868 (1912)

16

Tuttle vs. Henderson, 628 P.2d 1275,
(Utah 1981)
walton vs. Walton, 567
(Texas 1978)

s.w.

8

2d 66
14

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF AUIHORITIES

(Cont. )

Weste.nskow vs. Westenskow, 562 P .. 2d 1256,
(Utah 1977)

9

Wooley vs. Wooley, 113 Utah 391
195 P.2d 743 (1948)

10

Wright vs. Wriqht, 586 P.2d 443,
(Utah 1978)

7,12

Text

27 Am Jur 2d Equity
Section 131, P. 660

7

Constitutions, Statutes, Regulations, and Rules
45 CFR 302.50, 302.53

13

United States Constitution, Fifth Amendment,
Fourteenth Amendment

16

Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,
Section 30-3-5
Utah State Constitution Art. I, Section 7;
Art. VIII, Section 9

7

16
7

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal fran an Order to Show Cause in a
domestic action seeking, inter alia, an increase in child support
payments from the defendant.
DISPOSITION IN UJNER COURr
After a hearing before the court, sitting without a jw:y,
plaintiff was granted an increase in child support payments from $150. 00
to $225.00 per rronth.

It is from this portion of the Order which

defendant appeals.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The court below erred: by rewarding plaintiff equitable
relief, despite her unclean hands by abusing its discretion in deciding
that a material change in circumstance had taken place which warranted
an increase in child support, and by arbitrarily using a pre-detennined
schedule to detennine the na-v arrnunt of child sup.::>rt, and, thereby,
denying defendant his right to due process of law.
RELIEF SOOGHT ON .A.PPEAL

Defendant seeks an Order reversing the judgment of the court
belON and/or granting judgment in his favor, which denies an increase in
child support payments, or, that failing, a na-v hearing.
STATEMENr OF FACTS

History of the Case.

Plaintiff/Respondent and Defendant/

Appellant were divorced in the court belON on May 26, 1972.

Defendant

was ordered to pay child supp::>rt payments in the arrount of $150.00 per
rronth, and alim::my in the arrount of $50.00 per rronth.
Divorce)

(Decree of

Appellant made his payments irregularly, at first, but had

resolved the problem and paid regularly during recent years.

(F&C-1,
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T6, 91, 121.)
Resp:>ndent was reroarried on August 29, 1977.

(T-4, 5, 25)

Thereafter, resp:mdent deliberately concealed and hid the fact of her
remarriage, and continued to accept alimony paymmts from appellant.
(T-3, 5, 25, 38, 62, 121, F&C-1)

During June, 1980, approximately

thirty-five (35) nonths later, appellant discovered the remarriage.
(T-3, 87)

The parties exchanged letters with respect to the remarriage

and respondent's continued acceptance of alimony payments during the
said thirty-five rronth period.

(Exhibit 14D, 16P)

The parties were

unable to agree upon a resolution to the problem, so appellant ceased
rraking alinony payments and began deducting their equivalent from
child support, believing himself to have "prepaid child support" •
(T-6, 107)
Cormencement.
signed and

~re

On or about November 5, 1980, respondent

to an Affidavit in support of an Order to Sho.v Cause

requesting rrodification of the Decree of Divorce, to-wit:
in child supp:>rt to $250.00 per rronth.

On

an increase

page 2 of the said Affidavit,

paragraph 3, resp:>ndent acknowledged that she rray have been in default under
the Decree of Divorce, but reasoned that she had "* * * assmn:?d the
additional $50.00 was to cover the child's additional needs because of
her handicap and because Plaintiff was paying the health and accident
insurance of $22.00 per rconth,* * *
in re: r-bd:ification, p. 2.)

11

(See plaintiff's Order to Show Cause

It should be noted that the trial court

later found no handicap and no responsibility in appellant for the
said insurance premiums. (T-121, F&C page 2)
Discovery.

The parties then responded to written Interrogatories

which had been extended to each by the other.
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a.)

In her answers to appellant 1 s Interrogatories, respondent

itemized her necessary IrOnthly expenses, vJhich totalled $970.00, with
the rotation that "any amount remaining fran balance is used for clothin:r
arrl entertainment".

(Answer to Defendant's Interrogatories to Plaintiff,

Page 3, No. 10)
b.)

Appellant itemized his necessary expenses at a total of

$1,436.00 per rronth (Page 8, No. 17) and his net rronthly incane at
$1,399.92 (Page 7-8, No. 15, Answers to Plaintiff's Interrogatories to
Defen:iant) .
Evidentiary Hearing.

'Ihe matter came on for hearing before

the Hooorable John F. Wahlquist, District Court Judge, on October 22,
1981.
With respect to a change in cirCt.UnStance, the evidence adduced
before the Court was base:l upon inflation.
a.)

(T-16-17, 121-122)

Appellant's incan: had increased during the ten years

fran approxirrately $8,000.00 per year to approx.i..'1lately $25,000.00 per
year.
I~

(T-72)

Appellant testified that his net rronthly incane at the

time of the hearing was $1,540.00 per rronth, after taxes. · (T-92)

The

uncontradict.ed evidence with respect to his monthly necessary living
expenses was that they total the $1,436.00 per rronth sworn to in the
Answers to Interrogatories, plus additional expenses caused by inflation,
leaving approximately $30.00 in excess for use for clothing, vacation,
gi~s,

entertainment or similar frills, each rronth. (T-95-97, 106)
b.)

Resp:m:ient' s inccrae had increased rrore dramatically during

the same period.

She had risen from au. S. Civil Service rating of
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-4·Gs-4 to a rating of GSll, accounting for an annual inca:ne at the time

of the hearing of $22, 500. 00, which gave her a net income at the time
of the hearing of approx.L-nately $1,223.00 per rronth.

(T-4, 62, 122)

At the hearing, Respondent presented a new exhibit with respect to her
expenses (Exhibit lP), which indicated and additional $410.00 in rconthly
living expenses.

On cross examination, respondent testified that the

difference between the new schedule and her Interrogatory response
is the difference "between necessary and actual" expenses, based up:>n
her use of her rroney.

(T-55-6, test.inony with respect to expenses

T-8, 54-62)
As an additional change of circumstance, respondent claimed
that the parties' child had a learning disability.

'The parties

testified with respect to the matter (T-18, 42-4 7, 100) , but the Court
found the mild to be nonnal.

(T-122-123)

Argurrents Presented by the Parties.
argued to the trial court that respondent

'Na.S

Appellant' s counsel
not entitled to equitable

relief for t..1-ie reason that she does not have clean hands.

(TA-1)

respect to the child support issues, appellant argued that there

With
'Na.S

no

change in the cirCl.llllStance (TA-8), there was no need for an increase
indicated (TA-6, 15) , and that even if there were appellant did not have
the ability to pay an increased arrount (TA-6, 7, 15-16).
Respondent argued to the court that the Unifonn Child Support
Schedule of the Second Judicial District, adopted by policy statement
and rule (a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A"),

should be

utilized to detennine the arrount to be paid, based solely upon the
incane of appellant as applied to the schedule.

(TA-9, 17, 19)

The said
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schedule pu!"fOrts to be one pranulgated pursuant to 45 CFR 302. 53, with
respect to child support enforcenent by the Utah Department of Social
Services, Office of Recovery Services.

The expressed intention for the

use of the schedule relates to ex pa.rte temporary supp::>rt orders, no
hearings having yet been held.

(See Exhibit)

Respondent s counsel, in
1

urging its use, submitted that the schedule had been prepared by the
trial judge, and that the judge had followed it and ought
it in the instant case.

to

folla,v

(TA-19)

In response, appellant argued that the support issue should
be based upon the rrother's need and the father's abilit.:j to pay, and
not upon the schedule.

(TA-14)

Holding of Court Below.

With respect to the matter being

appealed from, the court below found that inflation was the chief change
in circumstance with respect to the p::>sition of appellant, and that
respcmdent has "done much 1:::>etter in life" and, further, that her
11

incane should improve ver:y rapidly for the next five years if she * * *
is able to hold her job at all * * *"

(T-122) The court found that

respondent had deliberately concealed her remarriage and that appellant
would be entitled to an offset for the am.Junt overpaid.

(T-121) Except

to note his opinion that the parties "need to update the child support
order after nine years", the court below gave no explanation, but raised
the child support figure to $225.00 per rronth.
Appeal.

(T-122, 123)

Appellant has appealed the decision of the court,

urging that the decision of the court belON could only have been made
arbitrarily on the basis of the pre-detennined schedule.

The abuse of

discretion resulted in an inequitable and unfair order, in that it
.d
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ignored the facts adduced which indicated that no rraterial change in
circumstance had taken place wrarranting an increase, and,

furt.~er,

that

appellant was unable to pay an increased anount, despite the express
assumptions made in the schedule.

Further, appellant urges that the

said arbitrary use of the schedule violated his right to due process of
law.

Finally, appellant urges that the plaintiff came to the court

belOW' in equity, without clean hands, and was not entitled to equitable
relief.

T =Reporter's Transcript of Testim::>ny and Ruling
TA= Reporter's Transcript of Arguments
F&C indicates Findings of Fact and Conclusions of I.aw
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rhis table •,;as designed according to criteria set forth in 45 CFR 302.53, and Has computed
using Section B of Form 849-P (revised Feb. 1981,) Utah Department of Social Services,
Office of Recovery Services, Basic Child Support Enforca~ent.
The amounts listed are intended to be used as the total temporary support order, given the
collective number of children cared for by the custoaia1 parent and the non-custodial
parent's gross monthly income {i.e., if the non-custodial parent's gross monthly income is
bet"Neen S1009 and S1098, and there are three children, the suggested 11 target 11 for a temporary support order ·ii1ou1d be S207 .OOo
rhe schedule is based upon the non-custodial parent's monthly gross income. It automatically assumes deductions (federal, state, FICA, retirement) and necessities such as housi~·
utilities, and transportation. It also assumes the earning potential of the absent parsnt
the abi 1i ty to borrow, needs of the child and the amount of assistance which 'NOU1 d be pa ic
to the chi1d under the full standard of need of the State's !'I-A plan. The fonnu1a is a1s
~esi~ned to insure, as a minimum, that the child for whom support is sought benefits from
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EX?U\NAT!ON OF TABLE
This schedule is based upon the non-custodial parent's monthly gross
income.

It automatically assumes deductions and necessities, normal taxes,

transportation, employment and living expenses, etc.
rt 'Has designed according to criteria set forth in 45 CFR 302. 53, and
was computed using Section B, of Form 849-P (revised Feb. 1981), Utah
Department of Social Services, Office of Recovery Services, Basic Child
Support

Enforca~ent

The amounts listed are intended to be used as the total e.x·parte
temporary support order, given the collective number of children of the
non-custodial parent who are cared for

by

the custodial parent, (i.e., if

the non-custod i a1 parent s gross month 1y income is· between $1025 and
1

S1075, and there are a total of three children in the care of the custodial

parent, the non-custodial parent could expect a temporary support order in.
the amount of S207.00.
NOTE:

The figures in this table are intended to give the parties a

"target," and to assist the parties in arriving at what has been determined
as reasonable and conscionable based upon mean family income, standard
deductions, welfare grants, etc.

The non-custodial party wi11 be granted

a hearing for a change frem this table, if such a
~-~e

_h~ar.i,i_g

is. reg.u_es'!:ed.! !he

of the table ls. not.. i11te.nded tc forectos.e tb.a Caurt. from. beari.a.g. i.ss.ues

involvin_g_ who should be the custodial parent.

Use of the table will be

interpreted to oe a waiver of a right to a temporary hearing, unless
requested by the adverse parent.
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tN '!'HE OISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT

?OL!CY STATEMENT

~any

parties at the bf!9inn1n9 of a divorce. petition the Court to

detaMTrine a

t~orary

child

su~port

figuM!. and

fr~uently

this is the

3e<:ause there is no general policy

only real issue between them.

statement. the parties ai-9 handicapped in n99ot1ating tenoorary

Occasiona11y, the costs in attorney fees. lost wages, and other

ments.

expenses of the hearing,
on their

me

pn:ipos~

exca~

the

r~al

difference

Court therefor"'! has searched

welfar~ de~artnent

ing Utah. that have

·,.,ftich

attemQ't to

bee~een

the parties

temcorary child support figures.
~or

a general standard which might

have some guidance to the parties in n99otiations.
the

agr~e

Mot inf'r'!quently.

is involved in the situation.

adop~e<i

A11 states,

inc1ud~

the Uniform Child.Support Aet. have ccnmittees

establish a conscionaot e standard of what the

par-...nt 'lfi 11 pay to a custx:ldia t

pa~nt

or a •,.;e1 far"'! agency.

non-~us't:Qdial

The Utah

ccrmri t:ae has consul tad .,..; th the other states, and- the current Utah
schedule is a.e--ached.

The ·..elfare aqencies use a for.nu1a that involves

some calculations, but the final
,,fleet-ad in the attached table..

~suit

is based on gross inc:=me, and is·

The ta.b1e assumes the

non-~ustodia1

parent has normal tastes, and ft makes normal a11owances for independent
11vinq and transportation, taxes, etc.
1itigat1on e.xpenses 1 a custodial

rn

an effort to avoid unnecessary

par~nt ~i11

ex-parta order in acr:ordanca with the ta.ble.

be permitt!d to secure an
It 'MOuld, of

~urse,

be

ne<::essary that the custodial parent's affidavit contain evidence of
infonnation
~hiTe

either

~arding

the

wetfa~

d1r~t1on a~er

rt is

~~e

income of the non-custodial

a~

ZS~

in

issued without hearings.

Coure 1 s nope that the adoption of suc:h a sche<iu1e will avoid

some litigation and expense.

!n adoptinq the Rule, the

intend to limit_ either _party's right ta a.
r!quest

~aren~.

nearinq officer-1 are authorized to vary
hearing, no such variances

~rr!f:~

h.eal:i..o.g..

~urt dc~s-~ot

1.h.ou.11 .e:t.t.nu sid.e.

it.
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RULE
A custodial party may secure an ex-parte child support order in accordance with the attached table.
the

non-custodi~1

parent s gross income, based on reasonably certain
1

.

information.

The request must contain an affidavit as to
.

Ex-parte orders without th.e affidavit will not be

granted~·

E.x-parte orders for child support amounts above the figures in the table
will not be grantea, nor will figures below the table be accepted, without
hearing.
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ARGUMENT
POINI' 1.

RESPONDENT, HAVING ENGAGED IN FRAUD AND DECEIT AND

THEREBY HAvmG FAILED TO ro EQUITY, WAS NOr ENTITLED TO A

wwm

OF

EQUITABLE RELIEF.

It is well settled that divorce actions an:l supplenental
actions therein for rrodifications of support orders are equitable in
nature.

U.C.A., 1953, 30-3-5.

Further, Article VIII, Section 9 of the

Utah Constitution penni.ts the Supreme Court to review questions of both
law and fact in equity cases, and, thus to make its own fin:li.ngs and
substitute its own judg:m3nt for that of the trial court when it is fair
and equitable in the interest of justice.

Wright vs. Wright 586 P.2d

443, 445 (Utah 1978).

It is furrlamental that it is incumbent upon one seeking equity
to do equity with respect to the subject matter involved, before relief
will be awarded.

27 Arn. Jur. 2d Equity § 131, Page 660: Coleman

Company, Inc. vs. Southwest Field Irrigation Canpany 584 P.2d 883, 884
(Utah 1978).

In Coleman supra., the plaintiff sought equitable relief

in the fonn of a prescriptive easement, after having changed the location
of a ditch, \-A'lich was involved in the need for the said easement, for
its own benefit and convenience.

In so doing, it had effectively

increased the burden ui::on the defendant, from whom the relief was sought,
so the court refused to grant equitable relief.
In Jacobson vs. Jacobson, 557 P.2d 156 (Utah 1976), a case
involvi03 the suit of a son against a father to reform a deed, in
equity, VJhere the plaintiff had previously deceived a court and creditors

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-8-

with respect to his claimed interest in the property, the Utah court
noted:

* * * The precept that equity does not reward one
who has engaged in fraud or deceit in the business
under consideration, but reserves its rewards for
those who are themselves acting in fairness and
go<Xi conscience, or as is sometimes said, to those
who have cane into court with clean hands.
In the case at han::l, it was made clear and the trial court
found that the resp:>n::lent had concealed her rerrarriage from the appellant
and accepted alimony payments fran him for a peric:rl of thirty-five
(35) rronths.

Further, it cannot be doubted that she knew that she was

not entitled to receive the said al.L'llOny, which conclusion can be
drawn by inference fran her S'WOrn statement that she thought of the
money as "additional" rroney.

(P.2 of her Affidavit in support of her

Order to Show Cause. )
Thus, respondent had failed to do equity by kroNingly accepting
alirrony payments which were no longer due, and, through her deceit and

fraudulent behavior, increased the b..lrden upon the appellant for support
payments.

After thirty-five months of receiving an extra $50.00 per

month, the respondent was caught.

Faced with receivirg only $100.00

per rronth, sre sought to be rewarded by the court in equity in a fashion
which would nake up for the rroney no longer being received.

As a result

of her previoos cheating on supp:>rt payments, the court belON should
have refused, as it did in Tuttle vs. Henderson, 628 P.2d 1275 (Utah 1981),
to consider equitable relief.

In the Tuttle case, Id., an action by a

mother seeking a change in custody after "snatching" the child from
the father, the court stated, at 1277, that

* * *

In any equitable proceeding, the fun::lamental
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rule is that he who seeks equity must do equity.
Plaintiff has not done equity in the instant case.
Am, therefore, respond.ent herein has not done equity.

The

court belo.v erred in granting an increase in child support.

POINT 2.
SUBS~~IALLY

UNDER THE FACTS PRESENTED, THE COURI' BELOW

ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCREI'ION IN FINDING A CHANGE IN

CIRCUMSTANCE SUFFICIENT TO INCREASE CHILD SUPPORT AND, FURrHER, IN
ITTILIZING

A PREDETERML.'IBD SCHEDULE AND

CJNSEOUENrLY ORDERING AN

L.~CREASE

IN CHILD SUPPORT TO $225.00 PER M:>NI'H.

As was noted at the beginning of Point 1, this is an equitable

action, and the court is authorized to make its own find.ings an:l substitute its own judgrrent for that of the court bela.v in the interest of
justice.

See also Dahlberg vs. Dahlberg, 77

u.

157, 292 P. 214, 217

(Utah 1930).
The Utah court has consistently noted that it may disturb the
result of such an action where the result is unjust or inequitable,
where the evidence preponderates against the findings, or where there
was a misapplication of the law or the facts resulting in such an error
or abuse of discretion.

Dahlberg vs. Dahlberg, Id. , at 216, WestenskCM

vs. Westenskc::M 562 P. 2d 1256, 1258 (Utah 1977) , McBrocrn vs. McBroan
14 Utah 2d 393, 384 P.2d 961, (1963).
noted that the court "*

In McBroan, Id., at 962 it was

* *will not disturb a trial court's judgment

in the division of property or awards of al:L.-noI1¥ and child support
unless it app:!ars to be unjust, inequitable, or contrary to the evidence
and. therefore an abuse of discretion.

Whether the awards are unjust
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-10or inequitable must necessarily depend up:m the facts ani circumstances
in each particular case." (Citation emitted)
It has, further, been stated consistently that there is no
general rule which may be followed by

th~

trial court, but that the

conclusion with respect to support payrrents must be "based upon "*
the peculiar circumstances of each case."
P.292, 293 (utah 1927).

* *

Bullen vs. Bullen, 71 U.63 262

See also Wooley vs. Wooley 113 Utah 391,

195 P.2d 743, 745, (1948) wherein the court noted that generally accepted
guidelines are only guidelines and that the evidence in each case must
be

applied.

There, the application of the guidelines resulted in an

unjust order with respect to the assets.
This court has set forth and referred to certain evidentiary
elements whiCh should be given consideration in detennining al.i.rrony,
supp:>rt payments arrl property settlements.
92 Utah 255 67 P.2d 265, 267, (1937);

See Pinion vs. Pinion,

Allen vs. Allen, 109

u.

99,

165 P.2d 872, 875 (1946).
In owen vs. OWen, 579 P.2d 911, 913, (Utah 1978), the court
addressed the issues applicable to an increase in child support thusly:
While an increase of the deferrlant's incare is
certainly an important factor to consider, this
proposition is also true: the fact that a man rray
so use his abilities as to increase his incane
should not necessarily impose a penalty up:m him
by autcmatically increasing his obligations urrler
a divorce decree. The increase in incane is only
to be considered along with the other facts and
circumstances concerning t.he needs of the children
and the ability of the father and rrother to provide
for them. There is yet another ma.tter which, though
not of controlling importance, the trial court could
legitimately give sane attention to in judging the
e:iuities as between these parties and the welfare
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-11of their children. That is that this defendant
appears to have willingly and regularly made the
payrrents required by the decree, which is al 1 too
frequently not the case.
In the instant case, each of these factors applies.

The

court belaw found that the appellant' s inca-oo had increased, due to
inflation.

At the same time, })is ex-wife's income had increased

dramatically and the court even predicted that her income would :improve
rapidly over the next five years.

(See T-121)

Some other relevant

facts and circumstances, which should have been given consideration
by the court, involve the relative expenses of the parties.

'While

appellant's necessary living ex:penses, without any rroney for frills
such as clothing, vacation, entertainment or gifts, left him with
approximately $30.00 per rronth for such extras (T-95-97); his exwife's situation was such that she had $400.00 left over after paying
for what she justified as her necessary expenses.

(T-55-56) (This fact

may be detennined by adding the then existing child supp::>rt ($150.00)
per rronth to her net rronthly incane, ($1,223.00), for $1,373.00 total,
and subtracting therefrom the $970.00 "necessary" expenses which she
incurred each rronth.

Included within those expenses were the expenses

necessary for supporting the child.

It is, therefore, easy to understand

why she did not bring an action to increase child suppjrt until she
was caught improperly accepting alimony payments.)
Had the court belc:M applied these facts, it could only have
fairly and equitably detennined that there was not a substantial change

in circumstance which warranted an increase in child suppjrt payments.
Despite inflation, the $150.00 per rronth adequately assisted the
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res.EXJndent in supJ;XJrting the parties' child.

If anything, the support

amount may have been set too high at the beginning.

Had the respondent

not so successfully increased her ability to provide supp:>rt, a change
in circumstance such as that referred to in Wright vs. Wright, supra,
at 445, might have teen found.

(There, inflationary wage increases had

kept the father in the same relative financial condition, while hurting
that of rcot.her and child.)
Even if inflation had caused a sufficient change in this case,
the court below should have rrore properly considered the ability of
the appellant to pay.

As

was noted in the Wright case, supra, at page 446,

there rrust be a finding with respect to the ability of the noncustodial
parent to

pay~

even if there is a requisite need.

In

light of the

uncontradicted :t;acts before the court with respect to the abilities of
the appellant in the instant case, it v-ould only be appropriate to
conclude that he had no ability to support an increase: especially not
a $75.00 per month increase.

Accordingly, the result of the order is

not only contrary to the evidence, but is unjust and inequitable.
A review of the facts adduced before the court, and application
of the said facts tothe various factors to be considered does not, in
any way, lend itself to a logical basis for the award of t11e court of
an increase to $225.00 per rronth child supp:>rt.
the court's

ONn

However, reference to

predetennined schedule does lend itself to such a

calculation, through matherratics.

If one takes the gross nonthly incane

of the appellant, approximately $2,148.00 (Exhibit 7P), and strictly
applies the schedule, the arrount to be paid would be $232.00.

Then,

allONing for the variance (within twenty-five (25%) percent according
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-13to the p::>licy statement) upon a hearing, it can be seen that the award

of an increase VJas easily within the range.
According to t.li.e face of the schedule, it was promulgated
pursuant to 45 CTR 302. 53.

The section referred to calls for the

provision of a fonnula (not a schedule) to

be

utilized "* * * pursuant

to Section 302.50 [detennination of amounts to "be collected in enforcing
child support Which had been :paid by the state]

~.ihen

there is no court

order covering the obligation." (Emphasis supplied) The section states
that the formula should take into account certain factors including the
incane and resources of the absent parent, the earning potential of the
absent parent, the reasonable necessities of the absent parent, the
ability of the absent parent to borro.v, and the needs of the child for
whan support is sought, inter alia.

Conspicuously absent fran such

criteria are similar provisions with respect to the ability of the
custodial parent to pay.

This absence would seem logical, as the

custcxiial parent v.ould not be likely to have a great ability to support
the child if she were seeking the support of the government to so do.
There is no evidence with respect to how the said criteria
were dealt with.

Rather, the schedule's explanation states that "[i]t

autorratically assumes deductions and necessities, nonnal taxes, transportation, e:nployment and living expenses, etc."

It further states

that it is for use in detennining the total ex parte temporary
supfX)rt order.

It is also intended to give parties a negotiating

"target".
T'ne explanation expressly provides that "(t]he noncustodial
party will be granted a hearing for a change fran this schedule, if
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-14such a hearing is requested." Further, in its adoption of the rule
utilizing the table, the District Court referred only to use in the
context of an ex pa.rte order, and in its policy statement stated that
In adopting the rule, the court does not intend to
limit either party's right to a hearing, should
either side request it.
It is clearly arbitrary and, therefore, a clear abuse of
discretion, to utilize such a fonnula or schedule to detennine the arrount
of child support Which must be paid.
282

s.w.

See, for example, Barlow vs. Barlow,

2d 429 (Texas 1955), wherein the court used"*** an established

fonnula, well known all over the district, *

* * (Id: at 431.) The
11

Texas court concluded that such a detennination was arbitrary, clearly
erroneous, and stated:
The facts of this case, as in every case
involving child support, require the exercise
of a sound discretion by the trial judge, and
not the arbitrary application of any fonnula.
Another Texas court also had occasion, in Walton vs. Walton,
567

s.w.

2d 66 (Texas 1978), to consider the use of a schedule.

Walton, the trial court used a
child support.

~chedule

In

supplied by the state bar in setting

There, the court did not find an abuse of discretion,

and distinguished the situation fran that in BarlON, noting that the
court belc:M it had utilized the schedule only to assist it in multiplying
the figures with respect to salaries, and the judge had ccmnented, on
the record, that he disagreed with the schedule and that his conclusion
\vas not within the suggested guidelines.

Id. 68-9 The Texas appellate

court found it not to be an abuse of discretion to make such a use of
a schedule.
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-15Appellate courts in Nebraska and Oregon, although not presented
with facts involving an arbitra:r:y use of a schedule such as that in
the instant case, have also had occasion to note that the determination
of the arrount of support vmich should be paid is not susceptible to
the awlication of a mathematical f onnula based upon the incare of the
noncustodial f0,rty.

See Peery vs. Peery, 191 Neb. 782, 217 N.W.2d

837, 839 (Nebraska 1974) ; Picker vs. Vollenhover, 290 P. 2d 789, 800
(Oregon 1955).
It is reasonably certain that, to make the detennination that
he did, the judge below could only have used the schedule which he
prepared to determine the child support amount.

Even respondent• s

cotmsel did not attempt an argument on the facts and circumstances in
advancing resp:mdent' s request for an increase.

Rather, he concluded

his argument with respect to child supp:>rt by stating:
Th.is schedule was prepared b'j your honor. Your
honor has followed it, and I would think, your
honor, that the schedule ought to be for the
benefit of this particular child because this
child needs it and needs the benefit of both
parents in order to rraintain the benefits that
the child should have. Thank you.

Api;:arently the trial judge, after having pre:pared the schedule,
came to believe it bad some inherent value.
To use the schedule 'Was arbitrary and an abuse of discretion.
It, further, led to an unfair and inequitable result.

POINT 3.

APP~

WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUI'IONAL RIGHT TO

DUE PROCESS OF LAW BY THE TRIAL COURT'S USE OF A PREDETEBMINED SCHEDULE,
INSTEAD OF THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BEFORE IT, TO ESTABLISH CHILD SUPPORr.
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-16The Fifth and Fourteenth amendments to the United States
Constitution and Article I, § 7 of the Utah State Constitution guarantee
all persons that they shall not be deprive:l of their property without
due process of law.
Wi t.l-i respect to the said protection under the Federal
Constitution, the United States Supreme Court, in State of Washington
ex rel.

Oregon Railroad

&

Navigation Ccmpany vs. Fairchild, 224 U.S.

510, 524-25, 56 L.Ed. 863, 868, (1912) observed that a party

* * *must have the right to secure and present
evidence ma.terial to the issue under investigation. It nust be given the opportunity by proof
and argtnnent to controvert the claim asserte:i
against it before a tribunal round not only to
listen, but to give legal effect to what has
been established. (Emphasis supplied)
The court also stated:
For the guarantee of the constitution extends
to the protection of fundamental rights, to the substance of the order as well as
to the notice and hearing which precede it.
"The :rrere fonn of the proceeding instituted
against the owner, even if he be admitted to
defend, cannot convert the process used in
the due process of law, if the necessary
result be to deprive him of his property
without canpensation. (Citation anitted)
11

See also Ivins vs. Hardy, 333 P.2d 471, Petition for Rehearing 334 P.2d 721, 722

(~ntana

1959), wherein the court applied the

principal to an arbitrary formula for setting a fee for a grazing pennit.
Similarly, in Christiansen vs. Harris, 109 U 1, 163 P. 2d 314,
317 (Utah 1945), the court has observed that under the Utah Constitution
due process protection extends to the right to have judgment rendered based
on the record which was made through the procedural protections.

Although,
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-17in the context of the opinion, the "essentials of due process" Which

are cited are limited to the deprivation of a person of his life or
liberty, it is submitted that the Utah principle applies equally to
the deprivation of property.

As has been established in Point 2 of this brief on appeal,
the only basis for the court's child support award of $225.00 is the
use of the predetennined schedule which had been adopted by the court
bela.N' for use in ex pa.rte, preliminary orders.
As

has also been shONn in Point 2, the only fair and equitable

conclusion which could have been reached through a proper application
of the facts before the court is that no substantial change in
circumstance warranting an increase in child support _p3.yments was shown
and, further, that even if it had been defendant does not have the ability
to meet such an increase as that established by the court through the
use of the schedule.

Therefore, although the court does not specifically

refer to it when making his order, it is clear fran these facts and
from the urgings of respondent's camsel in argument that the said
schedule was used.
To so determine the amount of rroney which appellant, by the
court's order will be deprived of, is to render meaningless and empty
the other procedurai protections, including the opportunity to present
evidence

to

the court.

To place an arbitrary schedule above the uncon-

tradicted evidence before the court turns appellant's right to a day
in court into a practical waste of time for all parties involved.

Appellant's right to due process was simply denied by the
said use

of the

schedule.
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Q)NCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Appellant therefore suhnits that
the court below substantially erred in granting to resp:mient a reward
of an increase in child support to $225.00 per rronth, arrl that the
decision of the lower court should be reversed.

No increase in child

support should have been awarded.
Resp:mdent did not deserve to be rewarded by the court in
equity.

The evidence clearly indicated arxl the court fourrl that respon::lent

bad concealed her remarriage frcm the appellant.

The concealment was

successful for a period of thirty-five rronths, during which she improperly
accepted alirrony payments from the appellant.

On the face of her

Affidavit filed with the Order to Show cause, it could be seen that
she was aware of what she was doing, but had rationalized it.

Courts,

including this court, have often said that equity will not reward
those who do rot cane to coort with clean hands in the business under
consideration.

Resporrlent fraudulently obtained extra support from

the appellant for nearly three years.

to agree to make up the debt.
increase in child supi;:ort.

After she was caught, she refused

Rather, she brought this act.ion for an

According to the law of equity, the court

should have refused to grant her relief, because of her unclean hands.
Even if the case could have been considered in equity, the
court below abused its discretion by not properly considering the
facts presented to it, and by arbitrarily applying a schedule drawn
for another purpose to detennine what arrount the child support should
be.

As appellant has stibnitted by thorough application of the facts

in his second p:>int, the evidence preporrlerates against the firx1ing
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-19-

that a substantial chan:;e in circumstance had ta."l(en place warranting
an increase in child support.

A revie.N of the relative financial

situations of the parties indicates that the then existing child supp::>rt
amount, $150.00 per rronth, was sufficient to assist the respondent in
supporting the child.

With that rroney, the respondent had an extra

$400.00 per nonth for non-necessary expenditures.

This \Vas largely

the result of the dram:ttic increase in her standard of livin:_j since
the divorce.
Mea.n.-ihile, the appellant's position had only improved as a
result of inflation.

After rcakirg the $150. 00 payment, the uncontradicted

evidence indicated that he VJOuld have approximately $30.00 left for nonnecessary eXJ;enditures, such as for clothing, gifts, entertainment and
the like.

Therefore, not only was the need satisfied by the previous

arrount, but it was also clear tbat the appellant simply could not
afford

to

pay any more.
Even so, the court belON abused its discretion and found a change

in circumstarx:e.

It awarded an increase to $225.00 per m:mth, which is

highly unjust and inequitable under all of the facts.

Based upon the

eviden:::e, alone, the decision should be reversed.
However, the trial court' s abuse of discretion became more
distinct as a result of arbitrariness.

Respondent's counsel argued

only that a predetermined schedule should be used to set child support.
The schedule, on its face, was intended only for use in absence of an
evidentiary hearing.
involvi~

Further, t.Yie rule had been drafted for situations

indigent custo:iial parents, and therefore made certain, un-
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defined, assumptions based thereon7 arrl looked only to the gross incane
of the noncustodial parent.

To have made use of such a schedule in

substitution for the facts was arbitrary.

The trial court could oot have

arrived at the a.'llount awarded through application of the facts presented,
except through application of appellant's gross incare to the schedule.
'As a result, the trial coort's decision was arbitrary, as well as

unfair and unjust, and clearly an abuse of discretion which should be
set aside.
In ad.dition to the abuse of discretion which resulted fran
the arbitrary use of the predetennined schedule, appellant suffered the
further consequence of being denied his right to due process of law.

It

is basic to our very syste.n of justice that certain rights, arrounting
to a day in coort, must be honored by the courts.

'Ihe culmination of

these procedural rights Im.lst be that, based upon the evidence properly
before it, the court 1W0Uld make its decision.

In

this case, even

though the parties were given an opp::>rtunity to present their evidence
and cross examine each others' witnesses to establish the relative
needs arrl abilities Which make up the situation of the parties, the
trial court took it upon himself to use a predetennined schedule to
detennine child support payments and, unjustly arrl through a deprivation
of due process, ignored the evidence.

Appellant was thereby denied

the very essence of his right to a day in court.
The decision of the trial judge should be reversed for any
arrl all of the reasons stated above, and the child support payment
should rema.in at $150. 00 per rronth.

That failing, appellant should be

granted a new hearing with directions that the court make its decision
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-21independent of arr:1 predetennined schedule.

Respectfully sul:mitted this 26th day of April, 1982.
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I hereby certify that on the 26th day of April, 1982, I mailed
two copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief to Pete N. Vlahos, 2447 Kiesel
Avenue, Ogden, Utah 84401.
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